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Abstract
While a widespread consensus exists among macroeconomists that the German labour market
reforms in 2003-2005 have successfully contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate, critics
claim that the reforms led to wage restraint and consequently consumption dampening accompanied
by beggar-thy-neighbour effects, harming Germany’s trade partners. We check up on the validity of
these arguments by means of a two-country DSGE model featuring intra-industry trade and labour
market frictions. Our results suggest that the disproportional growth of GDP (labour productivity)
in comparison to consumption (wages) are only partially driven by the reforms. However, we do
not find that the reforms contribute to Germany’s trade surplus and cause negative spillovers to
trading partners in terms of output and employment.
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1 Introduction
In the last decade, Germany launched a series of labour market reforms—the so-called
Hartz reforms—in order to deal with a protracted unemployment problem. Over the period
2003-2010, following the introduction of the first Hartz reform package, four trends are
conspicuous in the German macroeconomic data. First, the unemployment rate declined
significantly from 9.3% to 7.1%. Second, the increase in GDP of 8.6% has been much stronger
than the increase in consumption of 3.6%. Third, labour productivity rose significantly by
5.5%, accompanied by a merely moderate wage rise of 0.7%. Fourth, the German economy
registered large current account surpluses, which have been driven by trade surpluses to a
large extent and have persistently been above 5% of GDP since 2005.
While a widespread consensus exists among macroeconomists that the Hartz reforms have
successfully contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate, the role of the reforms in
driving the other aforementioned developments in the data is anything but clear-cut. Critics
of the Hartz reforms read those figures as supportive for the claim that the reforms led
to wage restraint and consequently consumption dampening accompanied by beggar-thy-
neighbour effects harming Germany’s trade partners. But the disproportional growth of
GDP (labour productivity) in comparison to consumption (wages) and the German trade
surplus may as well have been due to other factors. The aim of this paper is to shed light on
this controversy by means of a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model with search and matching frictions which is calibrated to German and rest of the euro
area data. In particular, we want to quantify, if any, the role of the Hartz reforms in the
aforementioned developments in the German macroeconomic data. Labour market reforms
have been on the policy agenda of many countries following the global financial crisis, and
we believe that our paper provides several insights as to their domestic and international
impact.
The Hartz reforms had two main components: measures to increase the efficiency of
matching the unemployed with vacancies in firms and a significant decline in the unemploy-
ment benefit ratio. In our analysis, we address three crucial aspects to evaluate the Hartz
reforms. First, we analyse the macroeconomic impact of both components of the reforms in
a unifying framework. This aspect has been missing in the existing studies on the Hartz re-
forms, although it is known that different reform components may interact with each other.1
Second, we investigate both the short-run and the long-run effects of the reforms, since those
may differ substantially. Negative short-run effects may hinder, for example, the willingness
for reforms notwithstanding positive long-run effects. Third, we are interested in both do-
1See Coe and Snower (1997), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Belot and
van Ours (2004).
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mestic and international effects of the Hartz reforms. The latter have not received the same
attention as the domestic effects in the literature, although many commentators accuse the
Hartz reforms for being the instrument of a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
We reckon that a DSGE framework provides a convenient methodological tool to address
all three of these aspects within a unifying framework. The DSGE model we work with is
borrowed from Fonseca, Patureau, and Sopraseuth (2009) and has several standard features.
Most importantly for our analysis, it features several labour market institutions and fiscal
policy parameters. In particular, unemployment results from search and matching frictions
a` la Pissarides (2000) in the labour market. Hence, the model comprises parameters for the
efficiency of matching the unemployed with vacant positions in firms and the unemployment
benefit ratio, both of which stood at the heart of the Hartz reforms. Furthermore, interna-
tional spillovers occur through two channels in the model: international goods trade2 and
international financial assets. To be more specific, each country specializes in the production
of its own good, whereas consumers in both countries consume a composite good comprising
the goods of both countries. This standard intra-industry trade framework maps the trade
flows in the euro area in an appropriate way. Finally, there is a riskless nominal interest rate
bond that helps to enhance the sharing of resources internationally.
Several studies that we review in the next section point to a steep increase in the matching
efficiency following the Hartz reforms, the range of the estimated increase being 10-30%.
Additionally, the last package of the Hartz reforms reduced the unemployment benefits by
roughly 10 percentage points. When we feed those Hartz phenomena into our model, it is
quite successful in replicating general trends in the German aggregate data over the period
2003-2010.3 In particular, we find that both reform components contributed significantly
and to a similar extent to the decline in the German unemployment rate and pushed the
economy to a higher growth path. Consequently, our findings suggest that a 3.3 percentage
point reduction in the unemployment rate and almost a quarter of the 8.6% increase in the
German GDP between 2003 and 2010 is associated with the positive effects of the Hartz
reforms.
While the reforms, evaluated separately as well as combined, boost the German economy
on many accounts in the model, they do not lead to any negative effects on the trade
partner—the rest of the euro area—in the long run. Note that this finding is intrinsic to
the model framework we work with. Our model belongs to the class of theoretical models
2Trade is reckoned to be the most important channel of international transmissions. See, e.g. Baxter and
Kouparitsas (2005).
3This implies that we compare 8-year changes in the data with steady state changes in our calibrated
model. We choose this period, since business cycle effects largely cancel out over such a long horizon. With
respect to the model dynamics this should not be problematic, since for most of the variables the adjustment
to the new steady state after the introduction of the reforms is completed to a large extent within 2-3 years.
Note that our arguments in this paper are not affected by the choice of the period.
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which generate, following labour market reforms, small positive spillovers to other countries
due to the existence of both intra-industry (Armingtonian) trade and search frictions in the
labour market a` la Pissarides (2000). These modelling devices seem appropriate to analyse
the effects of labour market reforms in the euro area, where the major part of trade is caused
by product differentiation and labour markets are far from being frictionless. Dao (2013a)
shows in a theoretical framework that is very similar to ours that reforms improving the
terms of trade of the foreign country will always lead to higher employment and production
there in the long-run, since firms and workers in the foreign country share rents in a way
that both benefit from the positive terms-of-trade effect. While Dao (2013a) focuses rather
on a reduction of labour taxes for firms, the Hartz reforms also induce positive terms-of-
trade effects for the rest of the euro area in our model and thus Dao’s finding applies to
our model as well. Note that the few existing empirical studies on the issue also point to
positive long-run effects of labour market reforms on trade partners. The short-run impact
of labour market reforms on the trade partners, in contrast, may not be so obvious a priori
and depend on the type of reform.
Our findings do not suggest a high degree of wage moderation in the sense that wages
decline relative to labour productivity in the face of the reforms. The combined reforms lead
to a decline in the labour productivity of 0.26%, whereas wages decline by 0.39% according to
our benchmark calibration.4 Similarly, only a small amount of the consumption dampening
in the data can be traced back to the Hartz reforms: the combined reforms would increase
the output (consumption) by 1.94% (1.35%). Finally, in our model the combined Hartz
reforms lead to trade deficits in the short-to-middle run, rather than to surpluses as in the
German data, according to our findings. This is particularly due to the fact that returns to
investment become higher in the German economy following the reforms, inducing foreign
households to register trade surpluses and invest in German bonds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The literature on the effects of labour
market reforms/institutions and the relation of our paper to that literature is discussed in
the next section. Section 3 presents our model. The quantitative results as well as their
sensitivity are subject of Section 4. The section starts with the discussion of the model
calibration followed by the presentation of the domestic and spillover effects of the Hartz
reforms as well as their sensitivity with respect to the calibration of several parameters in
separate subsections. Section 4 closes with a discussion of further factors that could—at
least partially—have contributed to the trends in the German data. Section 5 concludes.
4The matching efficiency increase alone would even lead to real wage gains where the real wage would
rise by 0.34% vis-a`-vis a labour productivity decline of 0.12%. In contrast, the unemployment benefit reform
alone would reduce equilibrium wages by 0.86% vis-a`-vis a labour productivity decline of merely 0.16%
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2 Related Literature
The Hartz reforms have been introduced in four law packages between 2003 and 2005.
The last reform package—the so-called Hartz IV— included a decrease of more than 10
percentage points in the unemployment benefit ratio.5 The measurement of the impact of the
first three Hartz law packages on the efficiency of matching the unemployed with vacancies
in firms is, however, more challenging and requires the use of econometric techniques.6 The
estimates of Fahr and Sunde (2009), that refer to the impact of the Hartz I/II reforms
measured over the period March 2000–December 2003, point to a 5-10% increase in the
matching efficiency. The authors measure the impact of the Hartz III reform over the period
March 2003–December 2004 to be somewhat weaker. Yet, the joint impact of the first three
Hartz law packages on the matching efficiency has been a visible 10-15% within a very short
period after their introduction according to the authors’ estimates. In a more recent study,
Klinger and Rothe (2012) obtain very similar numbers. Hertweck and Sigrist (2013) estimate
the range of increase in the efficiency of the matching process in Western Germany of the
combined reforms to lie between 12% and 31%, whereby their point estimate, a 23% decrease
in the matching efficiency, corresponds to a 20% decrease in the unemployment rate.
In addition to the studies that measure the extent of matching efficiency gains due to
Hartz reforms, few papers provide comprehensive analyses of how the reforms affected aggre-
gate macroeconomic variables in general and the unemployment rate in particular: Krause
and Uhlig (2012), Krebs and Scheffel (2013), Nie (2010) and Launov and Wa¨lde (forthcom-
ing). These studies all build on models with heterogeneous agents, and their main focus lies
on the effects of the Hartz IV reform that changed the German unemployment benefit system
substantially. Krause and Uhlig (2012) develop a quantitative labour market model similar
to the one in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007) with skill heterogeneity of workers, search and
matching frictions a` la Pissarides (2000), and endogenous job acceptance and separation
rates. Krebs and Scheffel (2013) combine the incomplete-market model of Krebs (2003)
with the model of search unemployment of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), while Nie (2010)
employs an extension of the same Ljungqvist-Sargent model with a training decision and a
5The previous German unemployment benefit system consisted of several layers of payments depending on
the length of unemployment and/or whether a person received additional vocational training. The estimate
of a decline of above 10 percentage points is based on the OECD calculations of the gross replacement ratio.
Dao (2013b) also uses a similar figure to ours.
6Hartz I-III included a number of efforts to improve the matching efficiency by improving the perfor-
mance of public employment services and of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP). In specific, the public
employment services were modernized in terms of their organizational structure and were geared to be result
and customer-oriented. In addition, incentives for alternative private placement services were introduced
to generate market forces and the allocation of measures was subordinated to cost effectiveness. Further-
more, direct integration measures were boosted vis-a`-vis training and job creation measures which prevent
participants from a fast return into work. See Jacobi and Kluve (2007) for a detailed review of all reform
measures.
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broader menu of unemployment benefits. The model of Launov and Wa¨lde (forthcoming)
is an extension of the standard matching model with time-dependent unemployment bene-
fits, endogenous effort, risk-averse households an exogenous “spell-effect” and Semi-Markov
features.
The foregoing papers all find a reduction in the equilibrium unemployment rate following
the Hartz IV reform, but differ in their estimates regarding the extent to which the reform
reduced the equilibrium unemployment rate in Germany. Krause and Uhlig (2012) find a
35% reduction in the equilibrium unemployment rate of Germany, Krebs and Scheffel (2013)
14% and Launov and Wa¨lde (forthcoming) merely 2.8%.7 Nie (2010), who explicitly distin-
guishes between the multiple levels of the former unemployment benefit system, finds that
the reduction in unemployment benefits for all workers, regardless of whether they were at-
tending a training programme, lowered the unemployment rate by 11.5% from 11.3% to 10%.
Given the large discrepancies between our model framework and the ones in the foregoing
studies, we find it useful to compare our findings with theirs. However, our comparisons will
mostly be limited to the unemployment rate and output, since the models of the existing
studies on the Hartz IV reform do not contain many further aggregate variables such as
consumption. Krebs and Scheffel (2013) are an exception in this regard. Moreover, all of
the existing studies abstract from international linkages.
A crucial aspect of structural reforms in labour (and product) markets is the potential
interaction of different reforms with each other, thus raising or reducing the impact of in-
dividual reform components, as implied by the results of several studies such as Coe and
Snower (1997), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Belot and
van Ours (2004). Yet, the existing studies on the Hartz reforms focus almost exclusively
on the impact of the Hartz IV reform, disregarding the impact of the first three reform
packages on the matching efficiency. Krause and Uhlig (2012) is the only study that briefly
mentions the impact of the matching efficiency increase, but Krause and Uhlig consider only
the long-run impact of a matching efficiency increase of 10%, guided by the findings of Fahr
and Sunde (2009). Yet, the authors evaluate the impact of such an increase in the matching
efficiency in an isolated manner and do not consider the joint impact of both Hartz reform
components on the unemployment rate and output. Our study appears to be the first one
to address this gap.
Another gap in the existing literature that we try to fill in our study regards the inter-
national spillover effects of the Hartz reforms. There is only one study by Dao (2013b), who
calibrates a two-country DSGE model with respect to Germany and the rest of the euro
area as we do. However, she looks at the impact of the decline in the German unemploy-
7Note that these calculations are based on different initial, pre-reform steady state unemployment rates.
The decline in Krause and Uhlig (2012) is from 10.8% to 8%, in Krebs and Scheffel (2013) from 9% to 7.76%,
and Launov and Wa¨lde (forthcoming) from 10.5% to 10.2%.
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ment benefit ratio (only in the long run) but does not consider the impact of the increase
in the matching efficiency and the way she constructs the labour market differs from ours.
While no other study addressed the issue pertaining to the Hartz reforms up to now, several
studies deal with the international effects of reforms in labour market institutions. Note
that a uniform focus on the international effects of labour market reforms is hardly possible,
since there is a lot of variation in the existing studies as to which labour market institutions
are the subject of reform. While some studies capture rigidities in labour markets with a
mark-up parameter on wages or an index that reflects labour market rigidities as a function
of several institutional parameters, others refer directly to clear-cut institutional parameters
such as labour taxes or unemployment benefits.
Two studies evaluate the spillover effects of labour market reforms empirically with cross-
country panel data, both of which report positive spillover effects of reforms to trading
partners. Dao (2013a) investigates the effect of foreign unit labour costs instrumented with
statutory social security contribution rates on domestic employment. Felbermayr, Larch,
and Lechthaler (2013) include, on the other hand, domestic and foreign tax wedges—defined
as the sum of the replacement rate, i.e. unemployment benefit ratio, and wage taxes—as
well as several further institutional variables alongside with control variables in their panel
regressions which explain the domestic unemployment rate.
The majority of the studies on the international effects of labour market reforms are
theoretical. The studies that we review in the following differ substantially across several
lines, particularly as to whether they possess New-Keynesian features and are dynamic or
static, how they treat labour market rigidities, the number of countries/regions they cover,
and whether they contain both traded and non-traded goods. Yet, despite such differences,
nearly all theoretical studies that have been published on the subject obtain positive spillover
effects of reforms in the long run. A notable exception is the study of Helpman and Itskhoki
(2010). Their model builds on a static Melitz-type model with heterogeneous firms enriched
with search and matching frictions in the labour market and an additional sector producing
homogeneous goods. Thus, their model incorporates intra- as well as inter-industry trade.
Spillovers occur mainly through decisions at the extensive margin caused by changes in
relative prices, i.e. workers switching between sectors and firms entering (and exiting) foreign
and domestic markets. Labour market reforms in the heterogeneous goods sector of one
country imply negative welfare effects for its neighbours whereas effects to employment are
more differentiated depending on the level of labour market frictions between sectors and
countries.
In contrast, Alessandria and Delacroix (2008) find, based on a model with Ricardian
trade and without search and matching frictions, that a major part of the welfare gains
created through an elimination of firing taxes is exported to trading partners because of
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worsened terms of trade. There are no spillovers to employment though. The authors argue
that this explains the reluctance for labour market reforms in many countries.
Our model generates, like the majority of the models in the literature, a positive terms-
of-trade effect for the (non-reforming) trade partner of the reforming country in the long run.
This effect accrues from the relative abundance of the reforming country’s good following
the labour market reform(s). The terms-of-trade improvement does, however, not necessarily
lead to higher output and employment in the trade partner. Dao (2013a) shows that with
a competitive labour market and a convenient parameterization of the utility function of
the households, negative spillover effects from reforms can occur. In particular, the wealth
effect on the labour supply from the terms-of-trade improvement can be larger than the
productivity effect on the labour demand in the non-reforming trade partner in such a case.
With rigidities in the labour market, in contrast, the employment levels in both countries
are lower in equilibrium and there is a rent to be shared between firms and workers in the
face of a terms-of-trade improvement in the long run. In other words, positive terms-of-trade
effects of output-enhancing labour market reforms in one country lead to positive long-run
employment effects for the trade partner if the labour market of the trade partner is subject
to rigidities.
As we have already mentioned above, the literature on the spillover effects of labour
market reforms is rather diverse as to the reform measures that are evaluated. Bayoumi,
Laxton, and Pesenti (2004), Everaert and Schule (2008) and Gomes, Jacquinot, Mohr, and
Pisani (2011) approximate the rigidity of labour market institutions by a mark-up parameter
that drives a wedge between marginal costs of labour and real wages. While those analyses
are illuminating, they do not deal with institutional parameters that policy-makers can ad-
dress directly and abstract from labour market frictions inducing involuntary unemployment.
Other studies refer to specific and observable labour market institutions and comprise the
unemployment phenomenon directly. Among those, Dao (2013a), Gomes, Jacquinot, and
Pisani (2012) and Coenen, McAdam, and Straub (2008) explore the impact of a reduction
in (employers’) labour tax rate, while Felbermayr, Larch, and Lechthaler (2012) focus solely
on the impact of a change in unemployment benefits. In several further studies such as Dao
(2013b), Felbermayr, Larch, and Lechthaler (2013) and Schwarzmu¨ller and Sta¨hler (2011),
the effects of more than one reform measure are investigated. These include changes in a
combination of a subgroup of measures such as labour taxes, unemployment benefits, search
costs, bargaining power of firms and workers and firing costs. Despite the diversity of the
models in terms of the measures they evaluate as well as their structure and calibration, the
bottom line from the previous paragraph does not change: in the long run, labour market
reforms lead to positive spillovers to other countries through the interplay of terms-of-trade
effects and labour market rigidities.
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To sum up, the spillover effects of labour market reforms are predominantly found to
be positive by the existing empirical and theoretical literature. However, the empirical
evidence as well as the theoretical analyses on the sign of reform spillovers such as the ones
in Dao (2013a) and Felbermayr, Larch, and Lechthaler (2013) refer only to long-run effects.
Although few studies such as Dao (2013a), Dao (2013b) and Gomes, Jacquinot, and Pisani
(2012) report positive short-run spillover effects of labour tax reductions, negative spillovers
in the short run in the case of other reform measures and/or alternative calibrations of the
models cannot be ruled out a priori.
3 The Model
In this section, we describe our model framework which is a standard two-country real
business cycle model enhanced by matching frictions in the labour market, an international
bond market and fiscal policy parameters. It closely follows Fonseca, Patureau, and So-
praseuth (2009). If not stated otherwise, we describe the decision problems of households
and firms in the home country, called country 1, in the following. The problem set of the
foreign country can be found in Appendix A.
3.1 Households
Each country is inhabited by an infinitely living mass of agents normalized to unity.
Agents maximize their lifetime utility at the beginning of each period without knowing
whether they will end up unemployed or not. But since they are assumed to be risk averse
and to have access to complete income insurance markets, their decisions are independent of
their individual labour market outcome. Only the aggregate outcome and, correspondingly,
the probability of being employed Nit in country i at period t matter. A representative
household in country 1 maximizes its expected life-time utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [N1tU(C
n
1t, h1t) + (1−N1t)U(C
u
1t)] (1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, Cn1t and C
u
1t denote consumption in case of employ-
ment and unemployment, respectively, and h1t represents the number of hours worked by an
employed agent. The number of hours per period is normalized to unity. Thus, time spend
on leisure is given by 1− h1t. The per-period utility functions of employed and unemployed
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individuals are additively separable in consumption and leisure and are given by
U(Cn1t, h1t) = log (C
n
1t) + κ
n
1
(1− h1t)
1−ξ
1− ξ
(2)
U(Cu1t) = log (C
u
1t) + κ
u
1 (3)
with κn1 and κ
u
1 being parameters that affect and determine the value of leisure for em-
ployed and unemployed agents, respectively, and 1
ξ
measuring the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of leisure with ξ > 0.
Agents receive an income w1th1t from employment, w1t being the hourly wage rate, subject
to an employees’ labour tax τd1 when they are employed, and fixed unemployment benefits
b1 otherwise. In addition, there are direct transfers from the government to households
(or lump-sum taxes on households depending on whether the consumption and labour tax
revenues are enough to cover the unemployment benefit payments) amounting to T1t and the
profits Π1t accruing from the domestic firms owned by the households. Furthermore, agents
can hold bonds denominated in terms of the domestic good available in an international
bond market which yield an interest payment it for each unit. Households spend their
income on consumption including a consumption tax τ c1 and on new bond holdings B1t+1. If
the household changes its bond holdings, it faces a portfolio adjustment cost CA1t which is
given by
CA1t =
Φb
2
(
B1t+1
P c1t
)2
(4)
that is scaled by the factor Φb > 0. The adjustment cost guarantees the stationarity of the
model in the light of its incomplete financial market.8
Taking the foregoing elements together, the budget constraint of the representative house-
hold expressed in terms of the good produced in country 1 is written as
P c1t (1 + τ
c
1)C
c
1t+B1t+1+P
c
1tCA1t = N1th1tw1t
(
1− τ d1
)
+(1−N1t) b1+B1t (1 + it)+T1t+Π1t
(5)
with P c1t being the consumer price index at home. As will be seen below, both employed and
unemployed agents consume the same amount Cc1t.
The households’ optimization decision problem is summarized by the Bellman equation
FH1t = max
Cn
1t
,Cu
1t
,B1t+1
[
N1tU(C
n
1t, h1t) + (1−N1t)U(C
u
1t) + βEt
(
FH1t+1
)]
(6)
which is subject to the budget constraint (5) and the law of motion of aggregate employment
8Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) discuss this issue in detail.
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N1t
N1t+1 = (1− s1)N1t + φ1t(1−N1t). (7)
In this equation, s1 is the constant job separation rate for employed workers which is ex-
ogenously given9 and φ1t the probability of finding a job when being unemployed. Thus,
φ1t(1 − N1t) is the number of successful matches which result in hirings H1t. The number
of unemployed agents in country 1 is given by U1t = 1− N1t. Since we normalize the mass
of the potential workforce to unity, U1t stands for the unemployment rate at the same time.
Note that the hours worked h1t do not directly enter the representative household’s optimiza-
tion problem, since they are determined by negotiations between firms and workers through
Nash-bargaining which is handled below.
We define λ1t as the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the budget constraint (5) and
derive the first order conditions of the representative agent’s optimization problem (6) as
follows. With respect to consumption we obtain
1
Cn1t
=
1
Cu1t
= (1 + τ c1)λ1tP
c
1t. (8)
This condition implies that the optimal level of consumption does not depend on the agents’
employment status. Therefore, we call the aggregate level of consumption Cc1t in the follow-
ing. Regarding the bond holdings, the optimality condition is given by
1 + Φb
B1t+1
P c1t
= βEt
[
λ1t+1
λ1t
(1 + it+1)
]
. (9)
The household’s preferences in consumption between foreign and domestic goods are
modelled by an Armington aggregator. The consumption level of country 1 is hence given
by
Cc1t =
[
κ
1
ηC1t
η−1
η + (1− κ)
1
η C2t
η−1
η
] η
η−1
, (10)
where 0 < κ < 1 is the weight of domestic goods in domestic spending and η > 0 is the
elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods. Cit denotes the domestic
consumption of goods produced in country i. We choose the good produced in country 1 to
be our nume´raire and fix its price P1t to unity. The terms of trade of the foreign country are
accordingly given by ToTt =
P2t
P1t
= P2t. With these definitions, the minimization of costs for
Cc1t results in the demand functions for the goods consumed in country 1 that read
C1t = κ (P
c
1t)
η Cc1t (11)
9This assumption is in accordance with empirical evidence: according to Bachmann (2005) job “separa-
tions are relatively flat over the business cycle” in Germany.
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C2t = (1− κ)
(
P c1t
ToTt
)η
Cc1t. (12)
3.2 Firms
In each country a continuum of firms operates in a perfectly competitive market. Firms
produce goods with the Cobb-Douglas production technology using domestic labour N1t and
capital K1t as input:
Y1t = A1K
α
1t (N1th1t)
1−α (13)
where 0 < 1 − α < 1 is the labour share of income. In addition, the output level depends
on the level of the technology A1, which we keep constant, since it has no relevance for our
analysis of the impacts of policy changes.
Each period firms face wage bills amounting to N1th1tw1t which are subject to taxes,
denoted by τ f1 , contributing to the government budget. Furthermore, they post vacancies
in the job market to adjust the size of the workforce for the next period, which is reduced
by exogenous job separation. Thereby, they incur a cost ω1 > 0 for each vacant job posted.
The total number of posted vacancies is V1t. With q1t being the probability of finding
an appropriate match, the number of successful matches in the labour market leading to
hirings H1t can be expressed as q1tV1t. Hence, we can rewrite the law of motion of aggregate
employment in terms of vacancies as
N1t+1 = (1− s1)N1t + q1tV1t. (14)
The accumulation of capital occurs according to the standard law of motion for capital
K1t+1 = (1− δ)K1t + I
c
1t, (15)
where 0 < δ < 1 stands for the capital depreciation rate and investment Ic1t is made up of the
same combination of domestic and foreign goods as the consumption basket of households.
Firms incur costs when adjusting their capital stock amounting to
CI1t =
ΦI
2
(K1t+1 −K1t)
2
K1t
, (16)
where ΦI > 0 is a scaling parameter.
Firms maximize their profits Π1t given by
Π1t = Y1t −N1th1tw1t
(
1 + τ f1
)
− ω1P
c
1tV1t − P
c
1tI
c
1t − P
c
1tCI1t. (17)
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Their optimization problem can be summarized as
F F1t = max
K1t,N1t
[
Π1t + βEt
(
λ1t+1
λ1t
F F1t+1
)]
, (18)
subject to the production technology (13), and the law of motion of capital (15) and aggregate
employment (14). Firms’ future profit flows are weighted by the ratio of the future to the
present Lagrange multiplier λ1t+1/λ1t of household’s budget constraint, since households are
the owners of the firms. This weight assesses the relative importance of wealth changes for
households.
The optimality conditions with respect to capital and labour can be combined in
qT1t = βEt
[
P c1t+1λ1t+1
P c1tλ1t
{
1
P c1t+1
α
Y1t+1
K1t+1
+ qT1t+1 − δ +
ΦI
2
(
Ic1t+1 − δK1t+1
K1t+1
)2}]
(19)
where we use Tobin’s q defined as qT1t = 1 + ΦI
Ic
1t
−δK1t
K1t
and
ω1
q1t
= βEt
[
P c1t+1λ1t+1
P c1tλ1t
{
1
P c1t+1
(1− α)
Y1t+1
N1t+1
−
1
P c1t+1
h1t+1w1t+1
(
1 + τ f1
)
+ (1− s1)
ω1
q1t+1
}]
.
(20)
3.3 Matching and Bargaining in the Labour Market
The process of matching vacancies and unemployed persons results in hirings according
to the following constant returns-to-scale technology proposed by Pissarides (2000):
H1t = χ1V
ψ
1t (1−N1t)
1−ψ (21)
where χ1 > 0 is a parameter that measures the efficiency of the matching process and
0 < ψ < 1 denotes the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies.
Each period firms and workers bargain over wages w1t and the number of hours worked
h1t within a Nash bargaining framework. The outcome of the negotiation process is obtained
by maximizing the weighted marginal value of an additional employed in terms of utility for
firms and households:
max
w1t,h1t
(
λ1t
∂F F1t
∂N1t
)ǫ(
∂FH1t
∂N1t
)1−ǫ
(22)
where 0 < ǫ < 1 measures the bargaining power of the firm. For the household the marginal
12
value of a match is given by
∂FH1t
∂N1t
= κu1 − κ
n
1
(1− h1t)
1−ξ
1− ξ
+ λ1t(h1tw1t(1− τ
d
1)− b1) + (1− s1 − φ1t)βEt
[
∂FH1t+1
∂N1t+1
]
. (23)
For firms the value of an additional worker (in terms of the final good) can be written as
∂F F1t
∂N1t
= (1− α)
Y1t
N1th1t
h1t − (1 + τ
f
1)h1tw1t + (1− s1)βEt
[
λ1t+1
λ1t
∂F F1t+1
∂N1t+1
]
, (24)
where we assume that the marginal value of work in production (1 − α) Y1t
N1th1t
is taken as
fixed in the bargaining process following Andolfatto (1996).
Defining labour market tightness θ1t as
V1t
U1t
, optimal labour contracts according to equa-
tion (22) imply
w1th1t =
1− ǫ
1 + τ f1
[
ω1P
c
1tθ1t + (1− α)
Y1t
N1t
]
+
ǫ
1− τ d1
[
b1 +
1
λ1t
(
κu1 − κ
n
1
(1− h1t)
1−ξ
1− ξ
)]
(25)
κn1
λ1t
(1− h1t)
−ξ =
1− τ d1
1 + τ f1
(1− α)
Y1t
N1th1t
. (26)
3.4 The Government
The governments in both countries balance their spending on transfers T1t and unem-
ployment benefits b1 with their income from consumption and labour taxation. In case the
amount of the unemployment benefits exceeds the tax revenue, the government imposes a
lump-sum tax on the household instead of a transfer payment. For the home country the
government budget constraint is hence
τ c1P
c
1tC
c
1t +
(
τ d1 + τ
f
1
)
N1th1tw1t = T1t + (1−N1t) b1 (27)
With unemployment benefits b1 fixed, transfer payments endogenously adjust to balance the
budget.
3.5 Equilibrium
Global equilibrium requires market clearing in financial and goods markets. For the
international bond market, the equilibrium is defined as
B1t+1 +B2t+1 = 0. (28)
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In the markets of home and foreign goods, the equilibrium is given by
Y1t = κ
(
1
P c1t
)
−η
Dc1t + (1− κ)
(
1
P c2t
)
−η
Dc2t (29)
Y2t = κ
(
ToTt
P c2t
)
−η
Dc2t + (1− κ)
(
ToTt
P c1t
)
−η
Dc1t, (30)
where Dcit denotes the aggregate demand in country i = 1, 2 which can be expressed as
Dcit = C
c
it + I
c
it + ωiVit + CIit + CAit. (31)
Market clearing in the composite good market is obtained if
P c1tD
c
1t + P
c
2tD
c
2t = Y1t + ToTtY2t (32)
holds.
Note that, due to Walras’ law, one of these market clearing conditions is redundant.
Finally, putting equations (5), (17), (27) and (31) together one obtains the evolution of the
balance of payments in country 1
B1t+1 − (1 + it)B1t = Y1t − P
c
1tD
c
1t. (33)
Note that the trade balance of country 1 reads TB1t = Y1t − P
c
1tD
c
1t and that of country 2
TB2t = ToTt Y2t − P
c
2tD
c
2t.
4 The Impact of the German Hartz Reforms
In this section, we start out by describing the calibration of our model to German and
euro area data. Then, we present the results from our quantitative analysis. First, we
explain the impact of the German labour market reforms on the German economy and
compare it to the data. In a second step, we discuss the spillover effects to the “rest of the
euro area”. In Subsection 4.4, we present the results of a sensitivity analysis to changes in
selected parameters and compare our results to the literature. Finally, we propose additional
factors that could contribute to the explanation of the gap between wages (consumption)
and productivity (output) growth as well as persistent trade surpluses in the German data.
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Table 1: Symmetric Calibration
Labour market Production technology Preferences Bond market
ǫ ωV/Y ψ q α h δ ΦI β κ η ξ Φb/NX
0.5 0.015 0.5 0.7 0.34 0.33 0.025 7 0.99 0.7 1 4 0.0038
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate our model to quarterly data and set most of the parameters symmetrically
between the two economies. Allowing for heterogeneity only in labour market and fiscal
policy parameters, i.e., potential reform parameters, enables us to abstract from differences
between the economies that are irrelevant for our analysis. We start by discussing the
commonly set parameters, which are summarized in Table 1.
Labour Market We follow the literature on labour market rigidities in Europe (see e.g.
Dao (2013b) or Faia, Lechthaler, and Merkl (2013)) in choosing ǫ = 0.5, i.e., by splitting
the bargaining power in the Nash-bargaining equally between firms and workers. We set the
elasticity of vacancies in the matching function ψ likewise to 0.5 in line with the estimates
of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), thus preserving the Hosios condition.10 We set the
aggregate vacancy posting costs per GDP ωV/Y to 1.5% as in Fonseca, Patureau, and
Sopraseuth (2009) and show in Subsection 4.4 how sensitive our results are with respect to
these costs. The probability of filling a vacancy q is typically set between 0.7 (den Haan,
Ramey, and Watson (2000) and Krause and Lubik (2007)) and 0.9 (Andolfatto (1996) and
Hairault (2002)). We choose the lower bound of values used in the literature, since a lower
probability seems more in line with the European case (see Campolmi and Faia (2011)).
Production Technology The production technology parameters are calibrated to reflect
the German/European production environment. While the labour share in production has
been roughly constant over the past decades in the US, it was subject to a considerable
decline in many European countries including Germany and the gap between the US and
Europe has narrowed.11 In our benchmark calibration, we set the elasticity of substitution
for capital α in the production function to 0.34 in accordance with the German data for the
past decade. Following the literature, the steady state value of hours worked h is set to 1/3
10The condition derived by Hosios (1990) implies that the outcome of the bargaining process and thus the
level of unemployment in equilibrium is efficient (i.e. welfare maximizing). It is met when the firm’s share
of surplus is equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies.
11According to the EU KLEMS database, the labour share of income in Germany declined from 0.72 in
the 1970s to around 0.66 in the 2000s. On the other hand, it shrank only by roughly 0.02 points from 0.64
to 0.62 in the US over the same period. See also Hogrefe and Kappler (2012).
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and the capital depreciation rate δ to 0.025.12 The scaling factor of capital adjustment costs
is chosen to be ΦI = 7, which is taken from Patureau (2007) and reflects the volatility of
investment (relative to output) in the G7 countries.13
Preferences The discount rate of households is given by β = 0.99, which corresponds to
an annual real interest rate of about 4% according to equation (9) in the steady state.14 ξ is
derived to have the value 4 assuming a (Frisch) labour supply elasticity of (1− h) /(h ξ) = 0.5
following the recommendation of Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011).15 The elasticity
of internationally traded goods η is set to 1 as in Heathcote and Perri (2013). The parameter
defining the home bias of consumed products κ is calibrated by setting the import-to-GDP
ratio (1 − κ) to a value of 0.3 which corresponds to the average import share observed in
Germany vis-a´-vis the world since the introduction of the euro. Since the home bias in the
consumption bundle as well as the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods might influence spillovers significantly via the trade channel, we carry out a sensitivity
analysis with respect to κ and η below.
Finally, the scaling parameter for portfolio adjustment of households Φb is derived using
empirical estimates of the ratio of the scaling parameter and steady state exports reported
to be 0.0038 by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002).
Heterogeneity in Labour Market Institutions and Fiscal Policy In our basic setup,
several parameters and steady state values of variables in country 2 are matched to German
data in 2003, whereas country 1 is calibrated to the euro area situation in 2003.16 We employ
data for the EA-12 countries excluding Germany whenever possible in our calculations but
12Our results in the next sections are hardly sensitive to the choice of the depreciation rate.
13We performed a sensitivity analysis setting ΦI to very low and very high values. Our quantitative results
in the next sections are not sensitive to variations in ΦI . There occurs only a slight change in the initial
dynamics of wages and consumption after the introduction of the reforms.
14The long term average in annual real interest rates in Germany till 2003 amounted to roughly 3 to 4%
(depending on the starting year) which would imply a discount rate between 0.993 and 0.99. Considering
only the past decade, on the other hand, would yield a significantly lower interest rate of about 1% and a
higher discount rate of 0.998. In the paper, we choose to work with the long term average. Yet, we checked
the implication of lower interest rates and higher discount rates as indicated by the recent past. Since the
consequent changes in the response to our reforms are minimal, we refrain from reporting further results.
15Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011) show that the estimates of the Frisch elasticity of aggregate
hours worked differ substantially between micro and macro models, but not the elasticity on the intensive
margin. Since our model differentiates between the intensive and extensive margins, we use the value of 0.5
recommended for the Frisch elasticity on the intensive margin. Furthermore, Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl
(2011) show that labour supply elasticities do not differ much across countries.
16If we use average values over the period 1999-2003 instead of 2003 values, the institutional parameters
in our calibration would hardly change. The only sizable difference would be a lower initial unemployment
rate which implies smaller effects from the reforms carried out. But since the high unemployment rate was
among the triggering factors of the reforms, we prefer to use its immediate pre-reform level.
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Table 2: Calibration of Heterogeneity in the Labour Market Institutions and Fiscal Policy
2003 2010
Germany EA Germany EA
1−N Unemployment 9.81 9.02 7.08 10.13
1/φ Av. duration of unemployment 9.53 16.57 8.68 14.20
φ Job finding probability 31.48 18.11 34.57 21.13
b/wh Unemployment benefit ratio 31.89 27.70 21.54 27.85
τ f Employers’ labour tax 17.00 23.75 16.20 23.34
τ d Employees’ labour tax 17.00 9.44 17.20 8.74
τ c Consumption tax 16.00 19.11 19.00 19.14
Notes : All numbers are in percentage points except the average duration of unemployment
which is given in months. Unemployment (average duration of unemployment) are EA (EU)
averages as published by the OECD including Germany. b/wh, τ f , τd and τc are calculated
as EA-12 averages excluding Germany using GDP weights at PPP exchange rates of the cor-
responding year.
Sources : OECD Reference Series, Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, OECD Labour Market Statistics,
OECD Benefits and Wages: Statistics, OECD Taxing Wages 2003, OECD Taxing Wages 2010,
OECD Recent Tax Policy Trends and Reforms in OECD Countries, OECD Consumption Tax
Trends 2012.
have sometimes to resort to aggregates including Germany. For simplicity we label the
aggregate EA in all tables. Since our reform scenarios are partially based on institutions
observed in 2010, we report for both Germany and the euro area the values corresponding
to 2010 as well. The corresponding figures are displayed in Table 2.
We use annual harmonised unemployment rates from the OECD Reference Series dataset
to calibrate the steady state unemployment rate 1−N . This definition excludes short term
fluctuations in unemployment lasting less than one year. The job finding probability φ is
set by using the inverse of the average unemployment duration. Data on average duration
of unemployment in months stem from the German Federal Employment Agency (Bunde-
sagentur fu¨r Arbeit) and for the euro area aggregate we use a European average provided by
the OECD Labour Market Statistics. Consequently, we derive the labour market tightness in
the steady state from the relationship θ = q/φ. We use the data on gross replacement rates
(GRR) from the OECD Benefits and Wages: Statistics in order to obtain the unemployment
benefit ratios of both regions and calibrate bi by setting the steady state value of b/(wh)
equal to the GRR values in 2003.17 The data on employers’ and employees’ tax rates on
17The GRR data consist of unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance benefits and do not
take tax and social security contributions on earnings and benefits into account. Furthermore, the GRR
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wages (τ f , τ d) as well as the consumption tax rate τ c stem from several OECD publications
(see Table 2). The parameters for the matching efficiency χ are calibrated using the steady
state relationships of the two countries in 2003. The same applies to the parameters κn and
κu that relate to the impact of leisure on utility.
In the next subsection, we provide a more detailed discussion on the heterogeneity in our
calibration of Germany and the euro area. Note that this heterogeneity is also accompanied
by differences in the exogenously given job separation rate. The steady state condition
derived from equation (7) implies s = φ(1 − N)/N . This yields job separation rates of
s1 = 0.018 and s2 = 0.034 in our model calibrated to 2003 values, which are in line with
empirical estimates (see Hobijn and S¸ahin (2009), Gartner, Merkl, and Rothe (2012) or
Kohlbrecher, Merkl, and Nordmeier (2013)).
4.2 The Impact of the Reforms in Germany
In contrast to many other countries, the German labour market performed remarkably
well during and in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009. Table 2 summarizes
a few telling observations. First, between 2003 and 2010, the unemployment rate increased by
1.1 percentage points in the EA (including Germany), whereas it decreased by 2.7 percentage
points in Germany. Second, the job finding probability increased by roughly 3 percentage
points in both regions.18 Third, the unemployment benefit ratio decreased by more than 10
percentage points in Germany, whereas it stayed constant in the rest of the EA-12 during the
period 2003-2010. Fourth, the three tax rates that we focus on in this study stayed roughly
constant over time in both Germany and the euro area. Note, however, that Germany differs
significantly from the average of the remaining EA-12 countries in this respect, particularly
in terms of labour taxation. In addition, recall from Section 2 that studies by Fahr and
Sunde (2009), Klinger and Rothe (2012) and Hertweck and Sigrist (2013) found a significant
increase in the matching efficiency of between 12% and 31% as consequence of the reform
package.
The foregoing numbers suggest that a large portion of the strong labour market perfor-
mance of Germany might be traced back to the increase in the matching efficiency due to
the reform laws called Hartz I-III and the decline in the unemployment benefit ratio due
to the last reform law, Hartz IV. Therefore, we ask in this subsection to what extent the
changes in these two parameters can explain the evolution of several variables in Germany
between 2003 and 2010 and whether they generate the undesirable effects put forth by critics
data are based on three different household types. They are a weighted average of the payments over the
first five years of unemployment with the first year being weighted more heavily.
18Note that the average length of unemployment may decrease in times of crisis thus increasing the job
finding probability because of a strong increase in the number of short-term unemployed.
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Table 3: Percentage Change in Selected Variables between 2003 and 2010
Germany EA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Data χ2 ↑ b2 ↓ χ2 ↑ χ2 ↑ b2 ↓ χ2 ↑
& b2 ↓ & b2 ↓
Nh 2.91 1.04 1.36 2.20 0.01 0.02 0.03
N 4.95 1.73 1.81 3.28 0.02 0.03 0.05
U -2.73 -1.56 -1.63 -2.96 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
φ 3.09 6.59 6.98 15.10 0.05 0.06 0.10
h -1.95 -0.67 -0.44 -1.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
w 0.70 0.34 -0.86 -0.39 0.12 0.16 0.26
Y 8.57 0.92 1.20 1.94 0.14 0.18 0.28
C 3.56 0.99 0.42 1.35 0.37 0.49 0.78
I 7.16 0.68 0.89 1.44 0.37 0.48 0.78
TOT -1.93 -0.78 -1.01 -1.63
Data source for the first column: OECD.Stat database.
Notes : The reported change is absolute for U and φ, and relative for the remaining variables.
Terms of trade are calculated as ratio of CPIs.
of the Hartz reforms. The spillover effects of the reforms on other EA members as well as
the effects on Germany’s trade balance are deferred to the next section.
Before we present the results from our quantitative experiments, we find it useful to have
a look at the first column of Table 3 which summarizes the evolution in selected variables over
the period 2003-2010. We observe that total hours worked increased by 2.9% in Germany
over this period. This increase resulted from the increase in employment by 5.0% and
occurred despite the decline in average hours worked per worker of 1.9%. At the same
time, real wages stagnated to a large extent and increased by merely 0.7% over the 8-year
period. Furthermore, the increase in GDP between 2003 and 2010 was with 8.6% much
higher than the increase in consumption which amounted only to 3.6% and was therefore
labeled consumption dampening in the introduction. Finally, the terms of trade of Germany
in comparison to its EA neighbours declined by 1.9%, computed as the ratio of consumer
price indices between Germany and the EA.19
In the following we discuss the effects of an increase in the matching efficiency and
a decrease in the unemployment benefit ratio first separately and then jointly to uncover
the mechanisms at work and to highlight the consequences of the interactions of the two
measures. We pay attention to the long-run effects of the reforms as well as to their short-run
19Using the ratio of GDP deflators yields a growth rate of -4.86.
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effects, since the latter also take centre stage in debates on the implementation of structural
reforms. Indeed, structural reforms may incur costs for states as well as for some groups
in the society which may hinder their implementation in practice, although their long-run
benefits may by far exceed the short-run costs. Another question of interest related to
short-run effects is how long it takes for structural reforms to take effect.
Increasing the matching efficiency In our first exercise, we increase the matching effi-
ciency parameter by 20% in Germany. This value is lower than the point estimate of 23%
provided by Hertweck and Sigrist (2013), while it is higher than the estimates of 10-15%
reported by Fahr and Sunde (2009) and Klinger and Rothe (2012). Starting out with the
parametrization of Germany and the EA as described above for 2003, the adjustment paths
of the selected variables of both economies are illustrated in Figure 1. The corresponding
equilibrium effects can be found in the second column of Table 3.
The efficiency increase in matching means that for given levels of vacancies and unem-
ployment more people are hired by firms. Hence, after a slight increase on impact firms
reduce their steady-state vacancy level by 15.7%. Since the equilibrium output rises by
slightly less than 1%, the share of vacancy filling costs of firms in national output declines
from 1.5% to 1.3%. At the same time, unemployed agents find a job more easily for a given
level of vacancies lowering the equilibrium unemployment rate in Germany to a new level
of 8.3%. Consequently, with a non-increasing labour force in our model world, the German
employment is predicted to grow by 1.7% in the long run.
With the job finding probability rising by 6.6 percentage points to 38.1% and complete
income insurance, the working members of the household slightly decrease their average
hours worked by 0.7%, i.e., the income effect dominates, and the hourly wages hence go up
by 0.3% in the long run. It is eye-catching that wages exhibit a non-monotonic behaviour
after the reform in contrast to other variables. After an initial rise following the reform, they
decline due to the drop in vacancies in the first six quarters, but rise again thereafter due to
the consumption-hours worked substitution effect.
The combined effect of the changes in employment and hours worked per employee on to-
tal hours worked amounts to an increase of 1.0%. Since the increase in wages is accompanied
by a decline in hours worked per employee of roughly the same order and the unemployment
benefits are fixed, however, the unemployment benefit ratio is hardly affected by the increase
in the matching efficiency. Note that even though hourly wages rise by 0.3%, the total wage
earnings of an employee (wh) decrease by 0.7% in comparison to the former steady state
because of the lower number of hours worked. Nevertheless, the total wage income of the
representative household (Nwh) increases by 1.4%, since more members of the household
find a job in the new steady state.
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Notes : Red-dashed (blue-solid) line shows the adjustment in Germany (EA) after a 20% in-
crease in the matching efficiency parameter χ of Germany. The initial parametrization follows
from the values for Germany and the EA in 2003 given in Table 2.
Figure 1: Increasing the matching efficiency
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Finally, output and consumption respectively increase by 0.9% and 1.0% in the long run
following the matching efficiency increase. That the consumption increases by slightly more
than output in percentage terms reflects the fact that some of the resources that are set free
from search activity can be channelled to private consumption. These results imply that the
first part of the Hartz reform package tackling the matching efficiency did not cause wage
restraint or consumption dampening. In contrast, wages increase even stronger than labour
productivity as a result of the matching efficiency increase in our model.
Decreasing the unemployment benefit ratio While the increase in the matching ef-
ficiency reduces the frictions in the labour market and thus facilitates higher output and
consumption levels, the impact of the second policy reform that we now analyze, the decline
in the unemployment benefit ratio by 10.35 percentage points, impacts directly on the labour
supply and reduces the outside option of workers in the Nash bargaining and thus ultimately
their wages. Note that the unemployment benefit ratio is not a parameter that we control
directly. Therefore, what we do in our exercise is to compute a new unemployment benefit
level (b) that is obtained by imposing the unemployment benefit ratio of 2010 in Table 2 on
total wage per employee (wh) as computed with our initial calibration with 2003 values for
Germany.20 So we decrease the unemployment benefit ratio based on 2003 total wages by
10.35%. Total wages per employee (wh) decline, however, by 1.3% as a result of this reform
at the new steady state. Therefore, the effective decline in the unemployment benefit ratio
at the new steady state reads 10.1 percentage points.
The unemployment effects of this reform are similar to the effects of the reforms that
increased the matching efficiency on many accounts as an inspection of Figure 2 and column
(3) of Table 3 shows. The unemployment rate declines to 8.2%, accompanied by a 1.8%
increase in employment, in the long run. Thereby, the deterioration in the outside option
of workers, which directly impacts on the bargaining outcome through the relationship in
equation (25), is the main factor behind the falling wages and corresponding increase in the
labour demand. The decline in the unemployment benefit ratio induces more unemployed
agents to work at the steady state to compensate for the decline in their income. The
subsequent decline in wages generates a negative substitution effect on the hours worked of
agents in employment.21 This leads firms to post 40% more vacancies than at the former
20One possibility would be to endogenize the unemployment benefit instead of fixing it to a certain value
as, e.g.,
bit = rriwithit,
where rri stand for the replacement ratio in country i. Such a modification of the model leads, however, to
an implausibly high volatility in the unemployment benefit level as it adjusts to changes in current wages
(w) and hours worked per employee (h). Fixing the unemployment benefit ratio only at the steady state is,
on the other hand, more successful in reflecting the data.
21On impact average hours worked rise to compensate the unanticipated reform shock given that employ-
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Notes : Red-dashed (blue-solid) line shows the adjustment in Germany (EA) after a 10.35%
decline in the unemployment benefit of Germany. The initial parametrization follows from the
values for Germany and the EA in 2003 given in Table 2.
Figure 2: Decreasing the unemployment benefits
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steady state on impact and 24.4% more in the long run. Consequently, hirings rise by 1.8%
and the job finding probability increases to 38.5% at the new steady state.
The total hours worked increases more strongly, by 1.4%, after the decline in unemploy-
ment benefits than after the increase in the matching efficiency. As to the total income of the
households from wages and unemployment benefits, the increase in equilibrium employment
does not compensate for the decline in the hourly wages and unemployment benefit level,
the total wage and unemployment benefit before-tax income (Nwh + (1−N) b) being 1.9%
lower at the new steady state than at the former steady state.
Despite the significant positive impact of the decline in the unemployment benefit on
employment, output is only weakly affected by the reform in the short run, since the income
loss due to the sharp decline in the unemployment benefit and hourly wages depresses the
consumption of households strongly. Consumption declines by 0.4% on impact, although
it steeply rises in the periods afterwards and eventually approaches its new steady state
level which is 0.4% higher than its previous steady state level. The long-run increase in
the output level after the decline in the unemployment benefits is with 1.2%, three times as
large as the increase in consumption in terms of percentage points. Thus, in contrast to the
reform targeting the matching efficiency, a stand-alone reduction of unemployment benefits
leads to gaps between the growth of labour productivity and wages as well as output and
consumption. The consumption dampening is of a similar size in relative terms as in the
data, whereas the wage restraint driven by the reduction in the unemployment benefit ratio
is much less pronounced in our model than in reality.
Increasing the matching efficiency and decreasing the unemployment benefit ra-
tio simultaneously We now introduce the two reforms simultaneously in the model in
order to see to what extent they can account for the changes we observe in the data. Before
we discuss the quantitative results of this exercise, it is apposite to note that the reforms
were not introduced simultaneously in reality. The first three Hartz reforms increasing the
matching efficiency were lauched in 2003 and 2004 in pieces, while the last Hartz reform
package decreasing the unemployment benefit ratio came in 2005. Moreover, it might be
convenient to assume that particularly the measures increasing the matching efficiency man-
ifested themselves gradually over time. Yet, we reckon that these observations should not
have a serious impact on the message of this paper, since the findings of Fahr and Sunde
(2009), who use data merely until the end of 2004, point to a very quick realization of
matching efficiency gains following the reforms. Finally, introducing the matching efficiency
gradually to the model would require arbitrary assumptions about the diffusion of the effects
of the first reform component, since that phenomenon is not directly observable in the data.
ment decisions are predetermined.
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Notes : Red-dashed (blue-solid) line shows the adjustment in Germany (EA) after a 20% in-
crease in the matching efficiency parameter χ and a 10.35% decline in the unemployment benefit
of Germany. The initial parametrization follows from the values for Germany and the EA in
2003 given in Table 2.
Figure 3: Increasing the matching efficiency and decreasing unemployment benefits simulta-
neously
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Another issue is the timing of the reforms: there were two years between the introduction
of Hartz I and Hartz IV. As has already been reported above for the stand-alone reform
components, the adjustment to the new equilibrium after reforms takes place within a period
of 2-3 years for most of the variables so that our comparison of equilibrium change with the
change in the data over an 8-year period would hardly be affected. As to the short run
dynamics, if we let the unemployment benefit reduction occur 8 quarters (i.e. 2 years) after
the matching efficiency increase, the dynamics would be identical to Figure 1 in the first 8
quarters and then a jump would occur due to the introduction of the matching efficiency
reforms which would be qualitatively similar to the dynamics in Figure 2. All in all, the
adjustment dynamics would take 5-6 years to converge to the new equilibrium to a large
extent for most variables, but the message of our study would hardly be affected by the
sequential introduction of the reforms.
The quantitative effects of our exercise are shown in Figure 3 and column (4) of Table
3. When the reforms are introduced simultaneously, their combined effects are not equal
to the sum of their individual effects, as a comparison of the sum of the second and third
columns of the same table with the numbers in the fourth column suggests. The summed
effects of the two separately conducted reforms is larger than the effects of the combined
reforms in column (4), which points to the existence of some nonlinearities when the two
reforms are introduced simultaneously. For example, whereas the stand-alone increase in the
matching efficiency and the reduction in unemployment benefit ratio respectively lead to a
1.56 and a 1.63 percentage point drop in the unemployment rate, making up a total of 3.19
percentage points, the simultaneous introduction of both reform components decreases the
unemployment rate by 2.96 percentage points in equilibrium. Recall that the studies on the
effects of Hartz reforms reviewed in Section 2, which investigate the impact of the Hartz IV
reform only, point to an unemployment rate reduction in the range of 2.8% to 35%. For
comparison, our finding of 2.96 percentage points reduction due to the entire Hartz reform
package follows from an initial unemployment rate 9.81% and hence suggests a 30% reduction
in the unemployment rate.22
The dynamic response to the combined reforms, shown in Figure 3 points to the meaning-
fulness of introducing reforms jointly and the importance of timing. The immediate decline
in German consumption by 0.4% after a 10.35% decline in the unemployment benefit may
render the implementation of that reform alone rather difficult, although the long-run con-
sumption increase is 0.5% and the consumption level exceeds its before-reform steady-state
level already one year after the reform. Nevertheless, if the unemployment benefit reform
is introduced simultaneously with the matching efficiency reforms, the immediate impact
22The introduction of the Hartz IV reform, i.e., unemployment benefit reduction, in our framework alone
would lead to a 16.6% reduction in the unemployment rate, which is roughly in the middle of the corre-
sponding values reported in the literature.
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Figure 4: Increasing the matching efficiency and decreasing unemployment benefits simulta-
neously
on consumption is virtually zero and increases gradually following the initial reform period.
If we allow for a gap between the introduction of the two reforms, after an initial increase
consumption would drop at the point in time where unemployment benefits are reduced and
then rise again, but never fall below its initial steady state level. In terms of government
budget, on the other hand, both reforms swell the German government coffers as the increase
in transfers to households indicate. Thus, such type of reforms could even be desirable at
times where government debt levels do not allow other measures that would incur costs for
the government budget.
With respect to investment in Germany, we observe that the simultaneous introduction
of both reforms reduces domestic investment at impact, although it increases significantly in
the long run as illustrated in Figure 4. However, the capital stock in the German economy
shows only a negligible decline at impact as a result of the reforms, since the loss from the
decline in investment is compensated by the flow of international bonds, i.e. capital from
the EA neighbours, as we discuss in the next subsection in more detail.
As to the speed of adjustment to the new equilibrium after reforms, we can differentiate
three groups of variables. First, job finding probability and unemployment benefit share
adjust immediately after the introduction of reforms, both at home and abroad. Second,
labour market variables—unemployment, vacancies, employment, average hours worked and
total hours worked—come very close to their new equilibrium values after the reforms within
roughly two years. This suggests that labour market reforms of the Hartz type lead to a
relatively fast adjustment in terms of (un)employment. This result is in accordance with
the findings of Krause and Uhlig (2012). Third, the adjustment of the remaining variables
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takes much longer than the ones in the aforementioned two groups. In particular, the very
slow adjustment of the trade balance and of net foreign assets (see Figure 6 in the next
subsection) is responsible for the slow adjustment of output and consumption. It should
be noted, however, that a large part of the adjustment in the latter variables occurs within
the horizon of the first two years, in which the labour market almost completes its long-run
adjustment to the reforms. The rest of the adjustment in output and consumption has to
do with the accumulation and liquidation of international bonds, is quantitatively small and
occurs very slowly over the long run.
A striking observation is that the model gets the qualitative changes, i.e., sign changes, in
the data correct following the two reforms, as a comparison of columns (1) and (4) in Table
3 suggests. The only exception to this assessment is the change in the wage rate, which
increased by 0.7% in the data and decreases by 0.4% in our calculations. This is due to the
absence of factors that we did hitherto not take into account as we discuss below. All in all,
our quantitative model suggests that these two reforms are able to explain a large portion
of what happened in the German data between 2003 and 2010. The estimate of our model
of the change in employment (hours worked per employee) is, for example, 3.3% (-1.1%),
whereas it happens to be 5.0% (-1.9%) in the data. The total hours worked, which increase
by 2.2% due to the two reforms in the model, increased by 2.9% in the data.
As to the output and consumption, the percentage increase in output was 8.6%, more than
twice as large as the percentage increase in consumption in the data. According to the model
estimates, however, the long-run increase in output is expected to be only 44% larger than
the increase in consumption. Furthermore, the model underestimates the increase in output
(consumption) by 6.8 (2.2) percentage points. Thus, our benchmark calibration suggests,
the Hartz reforms led to a less vigorous growth of consumption in comparison to output,
i.e., consumption dampening can partially be attributed to the Hartz reforms. Whereas the
percentage increase in output is higher than the consumption increase by a factor of 2.4 in
the data, it is higher by a factor of merely 1.4 with our benchmark calibration.
With respect to the gap between the growth in labour productivity and wages, the
combined reforms lead only to a very small discrepancy: a 0.3% decrease in productivity
faces a 0.4% drop in wages. In the data we observe an increase of productivity of 5.7%
against a 0.7% rise in wages. Hence, our exercise suggests that the combined Hartz reforms
cannot be a significant factor behind the observed wage restraint in the data. Nevertheless,
we observe that the two components of the Hartz reforms have quite different implications
in this regard. A stand-alone reform increasing the matching efficiency by 20% would lead
to an equilibrium real wage gain of 0.3% vis-a`-vis a labour productivity decline of 0.1%. In
other words, the matching efficiency component of the reforms has a dampening effect on
the wage restraint. A stand-alone unemployment benefit ratio reduction of 10.35 percentage
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points, in contrast, would reduce equilibrium wages by 0.9% and labour productivity by
0.2%. Hence, although the latter reform component would contribute somewhat to the wage
restraint, its contribution would be just a small portion of what is observed in the data.
The model overestimates the decline in the unemployment rate: it falls to 6.9% after the
introduction of the two reforms according to the model, while it declined to 7.1% in 2010
in reality. Note furthermore that there exists an inconsistency between our model and the
reality in this context. While we overestimate to decline in the unemployment (rate), we do
not overestimate the increase in the employment level with our model.23 This suggests that
demographic factors as well as in- and outflows to and from the potential workforce may also
have played a role in shaping the active working age population in the period of interest.
Moreover, the 2009 global financial and economic crisis may have affected the labour market
disproportionately negatively despite the anti-crisis measures of the German government.
We abstract from such effects in the paper.
Additionally, to isolate the effects triggered by the labour market reforms, we have ab-
stracted from developments in total factor productivity (TFP) in our analysis, which are
taken to be the main driving force of long-run growth in standard models such as King,
Plosser, and Rebelo (1988). In these models, growing variables such as output, consump-
tion, investment, wages and labour productivity share the same trend growth rate, while
employment (and hence unemployment) are stationary and do not exhibit a time trend.
Turning to the OECD.Stat database with this insight, we observe that the German multi-
factor productivity—i.e., TFP—increased by 4.4% over the period 2003-2010. Adding 4.4
percentage points to the predictions for the corresponding variables in column (4) of Table
3, the gap between the data and our model predictions for output, consumption and invest-
ment would diminish to a large extent and the sign of the change in wages would become
correct. But we would overshoot the increase in wages by 3.3 and in consumption by 2.2
percentage points, thus even decreasing the relative size of the growth gap between output
and consumption as well as labour productivity and wages.
To sum up, our calibrated model is able to mimic what happened in the German data to a
large extent when it is driven by the increase in the matching efficiency and the decline in the
unemployment benefit ratio together with the TFP growth as observed in the data. Yet, the
disproportional increase in output in comparison to consumption and in labor productivity
in comparison to real wages in the data can only partly be accounted for by the Hartz reforms
according to our findings. We address the remaining discrepancies in Section 4.5 and argue
that factors other than labour market reforms are likely to have been responsible for them.
23Recall that U for both the unemployment level and unemployment rate due to the normalization of the
entire workforce in our model.
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4.3 International Spillovers
Having discussed the effects of labour market reforms on the German economy, the focus
of this section moves to the spillover effects on the outside world, i.e., in our case on the
euro area neighbours which may also be reinterpreted as rest of the world since our baseline
calibration with κ = 0.7 reflects Germany’s import relationship with the rest of the world.
When our two reforms take effect simultaneously, the long-run increase in EA output is
0.28% as shown in column (7) of Table 3.24 The impact on the EA consumption of 0.78% is
stronger than the impact on output. These effects are driven mainly by the terms-of-trade
channel and follow partly from the existence of international capital markets as we show in
the following.
International spillovers are triggered by changes in the terms of trade ToTt in our frame-
work, similar to Dao (2013a). Following the German reforms, the output in Germany in-
creases, which induces a reduction in the relative price of the German good. The combined
long-run effect on the terms of trade of Germany, when the reforms are introduced simulta-
neously, is a decline of 1.63%. Note that this value is in line with what is reported for the
change in the German terms of trade vis-a`-vis EA in the data, see the first column of Table
3. The higher valuation of the EA good increases the surplus to be shared between firms
and workers through Nash bargaining and has positive employment and output effects on
the euro area. It should be noted, however, that the labour market effects of the German
reforms on its EA neighbours are rather limited: employment in the EA hardly moves in the
short run and increases negligibly by 0.05% in the long run, thus being two orders of mag-
nitude smaller than the effects observed in Germany. Furthermore, in the short-run there
are opposing effects which are, however, of very small size: the adjustment in employment,
vacancies and output is negative in the first two quarters, whereas the negative effects in
wages and transfers reverse after about two years.
The decline in the terms of trade of Germany manifests itself as a decline in the prices
P c1t and P
c
2t of the composite consumption goods of both regions as shown in the first graph
of Figure 5.25 Not surprisingly, the households of both regions increase the amount of the
German good that goes into their composite consumption good as the second and third
graphs of the same figure illustrate. The amount of the EA good in the consumption good
of both countries, on the other hand, decreases slightly in the first periods after the joint
reforms, whereas it also increases in both regions in the long run.
With the same logic as for consumption, the decline in the German terms of trade renders
24Just to put the numbers into context, 0.28% of German (rest of EA-12) GDP amounts to 6.99 (18.30)
billion EUR in 2010.
25Note that P c
1t =
[
κ+ (1− κ)ToT 1−ηt
] 1
1−η
and P c
2t =
[
κToT 1−ηt + (1− κ)
] 1
1−η
.
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Notes : In the first graph, red-dashed (blue-solid) line shows the price adjustment in Germany
(EA) after a 20% increase in the matching efficiency parameter χ and a 10.35% decline in the
unemployment benefit of Germany. In the second and third graphs, red-dashed (blue-solid) lines
show the percentage change in the German (EA) components of the EA and German composite
goods, respectively. The initial parametrization follows from the values for Germany and the
EA in 2003 given in Table 2.
Figure 5: Increasing the matching efficiency and decreasing unemployment benefits simulta-
neously
investments in both German and EA economies cheaper.26 This leads to an increase in
investment and hence accumulation of more capital in both regions after the reforms as has
already been illustrated in Figure 4. Note that the increase in the German capital stock also
partly occurs thanks to the existence of the international bond market. Whereas none of
the countries holds any bonds at the steady state in our two-country world, the favourable
macroeconomic conditions that follow from reforms in the German economy motivates EA
households to save some of their gain from German reforms and buy German bonds with
those savings which in turn are used for increasing German firms’ capital stock even further
in the middle run. This is reflected in the positive trade balance of the euro area economy in
the first 5-6 years after the introduction of the reforms. The EA trade balance turns slightly
negative after that period and approaches gradually zero in the very long run. Thereby, the
net foreign asset position of the EA as a share of GDP improves gradually, reaching a share
of 0.5% about 6 years after the introduction of the reforms as illustrated in Figure 6. These
assets are liquidated very slowly after that peak and are mainly used for building capital in
the euro area. In the long run, the capital stock in the EA increases by a significant 0.78%,
which is more than half of the relative increase in the German capital stock of 1.44%.
In a nutshell, we find positive spillovers of domestic labour market reforms to foreign
output, consumption, investment and wages. With Germany being very open (κ = 0.7), its
trade partners benefit from an increase in consumption which is more than half the amount
26Note that there is no distinction between consumption and investment goods within each country in our
model world, i.e. there is only one good the price of which has been given in the previous footnote.
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Figure 6: Increasing the matching efficiency and decreasing unemployment benefits simulta-
neously
of the effect observed in Germany. Spillover effects with respect to unemployment or hours
worked are, however, very limited in absolute terms and about two orders of magnitude
smaller than the effects in Germany.
4.4 Comparison with the Literature and Sensitivity
Analysis
In this subsection, we start with comparing our spillover results with the existing liter-
ature. Then, we turn our attention to the impact of a few parameters that might influence
the quantitative results significantly if set to different values than we used in our baseline
scenario, namely the parameters κ and η subsuming household preferences with respect to
the consumption bundle and the share of vacancy posting costs in GDP ωV
Y
determining ωi.
While the size of κ depends on the interpretation of the two-country setup, whether to cap-
ture Germany’s overall openness to trade or just its openness towards its EA-12 neighbours,
η is a parameter which is relatively hard to measure. Both κ and η are expected to affect
the size of spillovers through the trade channel. ω directly affects the size of the impact of
labour market reforms by influencing the vacancy posting behaviour of firms. In Table 4 we
summarize the reform-induced changes in the steady-state values under different scenarios
and compare them with our baseline calibration in column (1) where κ = 0.7 and η = 1 and
ωV
Y
= 0.015. The first column of the table states the modification made in comparison to
the baseline case.
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Comparison with the literature on spillovers As pointed out in the literature review
in Section 2, size and sign of spillovers are influenced by modelling and parametrization
choices. Since we model trade as intra-industry trade and allow for labour market frictions,
income effects outweigh competitiveness effects in our model and spillovers are positive in the
long run by construction. In the following, we discuss further crucial modelling assumptions
which may affect the size of spillovers. Then, we turn our attention to the sensitivity of our
quantitative results.
With respect to the size of spillovers, Felbermayr, Larch, and Lechthaler (2012) find
that a static multi-country trade model with heterogeneous firms and search-and-matching
unemployment underestimates the relatively large spillover effects found in the data. While
in their empirical analysis spillover effects to employment are one order of magnitude smaller
than the effects in the reforming countries, their theoretical model implies effects which are
about two orders of magnitude smaller, similar to our model or Dao (2013a). Therefore, the
authors introduce completely rigid real wages into their model and observe that spillovers of
reforms to the foreign country in terms of unemployment can become almost half as large
as in the home country. The increase in spillovers with rigid wages results from the fact
that quantities are adjusted much stronger due to a lack of adjustment possibilities through
wages. Yet, in our dynamic model, any degree of real wage rigidity with the exception
of perfectly rigid wages has no impact on the equilibrium effects of reforms, since wages
can be adjusted in the long-run. Assuming perfectly rigid wages for Germany or the EA
countries, however, seems exaggerated as the duration of standard collective wage agreements
in Germany amounts to 1-2 years.
Dao (2013b) highlights that reform effects can also be transmitted through the interplay
of national inflation and a common monetary policy. In her model, she finds that the short-
term response to an average tax cut is abated in the reforming country and amplified abroad
by the introduction of price rigidities and monetary policy. Thus, nominal rigidities do not
alter long-term effects but could dampen incentives to reform because of lower benefits at
home directly after the reform and stronger (involuntary) export of benefits to the foreign
country.
Furthermore, the relative country size may influence the size of spillovers. Felbermayr,
Larch, and Lechthaler (2013) find that the spillover effects of domestic labour market in-
stitutions are larger the larger the relative size of the home country. Our model implies
that Germany and the rest of the EA-12 are of equal size. Thus, spillovers are supposed to
become smaller if country size is taken into account in our setting as Germany constitutes
less than 30% of the EA-12. Additionally, as pointed out by Kose and Yi (2006) bilateral
trade linkages between two countries, say Germany and France, are much smaller than be-
tween Germany and the EA or the world. Therefore, spillover effects of the German reforms
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to single countries are supposed to be smaller than to the aggregate. In addition, there
could be third-country effects if the German labour market reforms do not affect all trading
partners to the same extent. This implies that terms of trade across these countries might
change as well and create additional positive or negative effects. To address these effects and
the difference between overall openness to trade and bilateral linkages adequately, a three-
country framework as in Kose and Yi (2006) is necessary which we leave to future research.
Note, nevertheless, that Everaert and Schule (2008) as well as Gomes, Jacquinot, and Pisani
(2012), by means of large scale multi-country models, find effects similar to the two-country
model literature following labour market reforms, namely small positive spillovers.
Differences in the preferences of the consumption good composition The choice
of the home-bias parameter κ in the country-specific composite consumption goods as well as
the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods η both have a quantitative
impact on the responses of domestic and foreign output, consumption, investment and wages
to reforms. In contrast, labour market variables as well as the qualitative results described
in the foregoing subsections are not altered. These parameters basically determine how the
‘cake’—the benefits in terms of economic outcome resulting from the reforms in the home
country—is divided up between the foreign and domestic economies. The stronger the home-
bias, i.e., the higher κ and the higher the elasticity parameter η the less the foreign country
participates in the reform effects. In the first alternative scenario, we set 1 − κ = 1 − 0.88
which corresponds to the average German import share from its EA-12 neighbours in the past
decade (in contrast to our baseline scenario where we considered its import share from the
rest of the world). For η there is no observable empirical counterpart available and estimates
by Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (2000) of the income and price elasticities of exports
and imports in the G7 on data till 1994 lie in a broad range from 0.8 to 2.3. Therefore, we
alternatively consider a relatively low value of 0.85 suggested by Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc
(2008) and a higher value of 1.5 which has often been used in international real business cycle
models starting with Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994).
If we reduce κ to 0.88, i.e., the share of the domestic good in the foreign consumption
bundle is smaller (and larger in the domestic bundle), foreign consumers profit from the price
reduction in domestic goods as a result of the reforms less strongly (and domestic consumers
accordingly more strongly) than in the baseline scenario (see column (2) of Table 4). This
goes along with the fact that the drop in terms of trade ToTt after the reforms is stronger
with higher κ and the adjustment in the trade balance is slower and of a smaller size. In
addition, the adjustment through the international bond market occurs more slowly, leading
to a weaker (stronger) increase in investment and capital abroad (at home).
Lower values of η imply that consumers in both countries are more prone to adjusting
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the composition of their final consumption good in response to exogenous impulses in the
economy. Hence, the EA neighbours demand even more of the German and their own good
after the joint reforms accompanied by a stronger drop in prices. In consequence, terms of
trade deteriorate more strongly with a lower elasticity and adjustments in the trade balance
(TB) and the net foreign asset position (NFA) occur more slowly and are smaller compared
to the baseline scenario. For η = 0.85 the TB and NFA of the EA are even negative in the
first two and six quarters, respectively. This reflects the fact that a lower elasticity implies
stronger adjustment in the composite consumption and investment goods in Germany in the
period of the reform, since German firms cannot adjust the labour input immediately and
therefore post more vacancies on impact than at the new steady-state level. In the long-run,
output and consumption grow weaker at home and rise considerably stronger abroad. The
opposite applies to the high elasticity case (see column (4) of Table 4). The adjustments in
the labour market at home in terms of employment, hours worked or unemployment after
the reforms are hardly effected by changes in the preference parameters. In contrast, abroad
a higher home bias of κ = 0.88 or higher elasticity of substitution η = 1.5 shrinks the already
small spillover effects to unemployment/employment found for the baseline calibration even
further. In addition, choosing higher values for these parameters implies a smaller gap
between output and consumption growth than in the baseline case at home. The gap between
productivity and wage growth is not affected.
Lower vacancy posting costs With our choice of ωV
Y
= 0.015 we are close to the upper
bound of vacancy posting cost shares used in the literature, which seems justifiable for
European economies vis-a´-vis the US calibration used in most studies. Nevertheless, the
broad range of values used by other authors for the US and the missing empirical evidence
for the German and the European case require testing for sensitivity with respect to ωV
Y
.
Table 4 includes in column (5) the implied changes in the steady state values due to reforms
when the ratio of total vacancy posting costs to output is fixed to 1% as in Hairault (2002).
If firms are faced with lower costs, they post more vacancies in response to the combined
reforms, more hirings occur and the unemployment rate shrinks even stronger to 6.4% in
Germany. This leads to higher domestic output, consumption and total hours worked, while
wages drop stronger than in the baseline scenario. With a lower vacancy cost share, there
is a slightly larger gap between the development of labour productivity and wages as well
as output and consumption growth. However, the new parametrization does by no means
change our previous conclusions on the contribution of the Hartz reforms to wage moderation
and consumption dampening. The amplified effects in the domestic market spill over to the
foreign economy through a stronger change in relative prices, i.e., in terms of trade. Thus,
we observe stronger increases in foreign output and consumption as well as employment and
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Table 4: Sensitivity Scenarios: Percentage in Selected Variables after Reforming χ and b in
Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Scenario Baseline κ = .88 η = .85 η = 1.5 ωV
Y
= 0.01
G
er
m
an
y
Nh 2.20 2.21 2.20 2.21 2.55
N 3.28 3.30 3.28 3.29 3.77
U -2.96 -2.98 -2.96 -2.97 -3.40
φ 15.10 15.21 15.06 15.17 18.52
h -1.05 -1.05 -1.04 -1.05 -1.18
w -0.39 -0.25 -0.44 -0.30 -0.54
Y 1.94 2.09 1.89 2.04 2.25
C 1.35 1.76 1.20 1.62 1.50
I 1.44 1.85 1.30 1.71 1.67
ToT -1.63 -1.92 -1.93 -1.07 -1.87
E
A
Nh 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04
N 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.06
U -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06
φ 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.12
h -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
w 0.26 0.12 0.31 0.17 0.30
Y 0.28 0.13 0.34 0.19 0.33
C 0.78 0.37 0.93 0.51 0.91
I 0.78 0.37 0.93 0.51 0.90
ToT -1.63 -1.92 -1.93 -1.07 -1.87
Notes : In the baseline scenario, κ = 0.7, η = 1 and ωV
Y
= 0.015. Percentage change in U und
φ is absolute, in all other variables relative.
job finding probability. This suggests that in case the true costs of vacancy posting are
lower than in our benchmark scenario, reform effects would be larger for domestic as well as
foreign countries. But the relative size of the spillovers becomes only slightly larger than in
the baseline case. Even if we decrease ωV
Y
further to 0.5%, the implied change in employment
abroad makes up less than 2% of the effect observed in the home country.
4.5 Alternative Explanations
As pointed out in the introduction, dampened consumption relative to output, wage
restraint in the form of weaker growth of wages than labour productivity as well as the per-
sistent large current account and trade surpluses recently observed in the German economy
are often attributed to the Hartz reforms by critics. When our model is subjected solely to
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the Hartz reforms, however, it can only partially account for the consumption dampening
and the wage restraint while generating a trade deficit in the short-to-middle run instead
of a surplus, as we have seen in the foregoing subsections. In this subsection, we discuss
alternative explanations for those phenomena which are not related to the labour market
reforms.
We first turn our attention to the bargaining power of workers ǫ which is another criticial
parameter in our model, particularly for labour market outcomes. Recent literature sug-
gests that globalization has been one of the drivers of the decline in union membership and
thus lower bargaining power of unions (see, e.g., Dreher and Gaston (2007) and Abraham,
Konings, and Vanormelingen (2009)). In Europe, this trend has been further strengthened
by the eastward expansion of the European Union in 2004, which took place simultaneously
with the Hartz reforms. In Germany, for example, trade union density decreased from 25.3%
to 18.6% in the period 1999 to 2010 according to OECD data.27
In order to explore the potential impact of the decline in the bargaining power of the
workers, we first introduce a permanent shock in Germany alone which shifts the bargaining
power of the firms ǫ from 0.5 to 0.6. Both short-run and long-run dynamics that accrue
from this change are very similar to the dynamics that occur after a stand-alone 10.35
percentage point reduction in unemployment benefits in our model, for which reason we
do not report any results from the new experiment in tables or graphs. This should not
be surprising, since reductions in both the bargaining power paramater and unemployment
benefits weaken workers’ ability to impose their terms upon firms in the Nash bargaining
process. Hence, the increase in the bargaining power of firms further contributes to the
explanation of consumption dampening and wage restraint as does the unemployment benefit
reduction, whereas it does not lead to a surplus in the German trade balance at all.
In a second exercise, we impose a contemporaneous and persistent increase of ǫ to 0.6 in
both Germany and the rest of the euro area, since globalisation and eastward expansion of
the EU affected both of them. Nearly all EU countries registered a decline in trade union
density over the period 1999-2010 according to the OECD data. When the bargaining power
of firms rises to 0.6 in both Germany and the rest of the euro area, the results for Germany
as to most of the variables are very similar to the previous exercise, where we increased ǫ
for Germany only. In the upper panel of Figure 7, we report the adjustment of the variables
pertaining to the consumption dampening and wage restraint debate, which do not change
much in comparison to the previous exercise. Conspicuous differences exist, however, in the
adjustment of the terms of trade and the current account, which are reported in the lower
panel of Figure 7. The response of the terms of trade is still negative, yet much smaller
27“Trade union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members,
divided by the total number of wage and salary earners” citing the OECD Labour Force Statistics website.
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Figure 7: Decreasing the bargaining power of workers
in absolute terms. Moreover, it shows a hump-shaped response in contrast to the foregoing
scenario. The German trade account exhibits a small positive surplus of 0.1% of GDP in the
first year following the increase in ǫ, which disappears, however, from the second year on.
However, the volume and persistency of the surplus hardly matches the data which registers
surpluses above 5% of the GDP after 2005.
While our exercise concerning the change in the bargaining power of workers is tentative
due to the difficulty of measuring the value of the parameter in the data, we believe that it
provides valuable insights for our discussion.28 On the one hand, we see the potential for
the change in that parameter to further explain the consumption dampening and the wage
moderation; yet possibly not large enough to close the gap between the model and the data.
On the other hand, the decline in the bargaining power of workers can also not explain the
large and persistent German trade surpluses.
In the last part of this subsection, we turn our attention to alternative explanations
28We recognize that the level of decline in the bargaining power as well as the exposure of countries to
globalization vary a lot. Moreover, the change occurs not at once but gradually. Yet, these aspects are hard
to include in our current framework and are left to future studies.
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for the German trade surplus, which could not be traced back to the Hartz reforms or
the change in the bargaining power of workers in our model. Therefore, we next review
two recent studies which investigated the driving forces of current account and/or trade
surpluses (among others). In the first of these, European Commission (2012) economists,
who study current account surpluses in the EU by means of an estimated version of the
QUEST model of Ratto, Roeger, and Veld (2009), discuss several hypotheses that could
potentially explain the German trade surpluses. One hypothesis is that competitiveness
gains through wage restraint and labour market reforms have been a major force behind
the surpluses.29 Thereby, the authors implicitly see the wage restraint solely as the product
of labour market reforms30 and emphasize that a decline in the relative unit labour costs
has improved the trade competitiveness of Germany relative to the rest of the euro area.
However, their results attribute only a moderate role to the wage restraint in the emergence
of the surpluses, while the Commission economists find the main drivers of the surpluses to
be (i) financial market integration and interest rate convergence in the euro area leading to
a narrowing of risk premia and thus net capital outflow from Germany and correspondingly
weakening domestic investment, (ii) strong world demand particularly for German capital
goods as well as (iii) higher household savings due to population aging accompanied by the
introduction of a private pillar in the pension system.
In another related paper, Estrada, Gal´ı, and Lo´pez-Salido (2013), who study patterns
of convergence and divergence in the euro area empirically, investigate the driving forces of
the current account among others. They find that relative price levels of tradable goods do
not show a strong relation with current account imbalances, whereas the so-called non-price
competitiveness factors do. Four non-price competitiveness factors stand out in explaining
the current account performance: (i) goods markets efficiency; (ii) the ability of entrepreneurs
to adopt existing technologies to enhance the productivity of industries; (iii) the quality of
countries’ business networks and supporting industries; and (iv) innovation capabilities.
Estrada, Gal´ı, and Lo´pez-Salido (2013) find the role of these factors to be more important
than a reduction in wages for reducing and sustaining current account deficits.
To sum up, both European Commission (2012) and Estrada, Gal´ı, and Lo´pez-Salido
(2013) emphasize the importance of a number of non-competitiveness factors as potential
driving forces the German current account/trade surpluses. While those factors are out of
the scope of our analysis and not included in our model, they are useful potential candidates
to explain the gap particularly as to trade surpluses between our model’ estimates and the
29The Commission economists approximate the German labour market reforms by an exogenous labour
supply expansion and the reduction in the unemployment benefit ratio.
30Note that our results contradict this view, even when we consider a reduction of the unemployment
benefit ratio complemented with a decline in the bargaining power of workers. In other words, our analysis
suggests the existence of other factors to fully explain the wage restraint.
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data. The bottom line of this review for our study is that the driving forces of surpluses are
to be searched for in factors other than the Hartz reforms.
5 Conclusion
The still observable repercussions of the 2008-2009 global recession and the slow ad-
justment in its aftermath, accompanied by monetary and fiscal policies that have already
reached their limits as growth stimulator, have put structural reforms on top of the reform
agenda of policy makers in many countries. Thereby, labour market reforms feature a high
priority, particularly in the European Union where unemployment rates reached high levels
in many member economies. In this context, the conspicuous success of the German labour
market reforms of 2003-2005—the so-called Hartz reforms—in bringing down unemployment
rates seems exemplary. Yet, critics of the Hartz reforms often argue that the reforms had
undesirable side effects leading to a strong wage restraint and consequently consumption
dampening in Germany accompanied by beggar-thy-neighbour effects harming the country’s
trade partners.
In the current paper, our goal has been to check up on the validity of this view by
investigating the impact of the reform package on macroeconomic outcomes both nationally
and in terms of international spillovers. We chose a two-country DSGE model with labour
market frictions and intra-industry trade calibrated to data for Germany and the rest of the
euro area—the most important trade partner of Germany—as our laboratory to this end.
Our findings show that increasing the matching efficiency and lowering unemployment
benefits in our model in line with the observed implications of the Hartz reforms indeed lead
to a drop in the unemployment rate of similar size as observed in the data, but neither the
wage moderation nor the consumption dampening are as strong as observed in the data.
While the matching efficiency increase does not produce such effects at all, reducing the
unemployment benefits indeed creates a gap between wages and productivity growth and
dampens domestic consumption relative to output to a certain extent. Thus, we conclude,
additional factors must have contributed to these developments in the data. As we argue
in this paper, globalization-driven changes in the bargaining power of workers represent a
prominent factor, which could further explain the wage restraint and the dampened growth
of domestic consumption.
In addition, our model does not imply negative spillover effects from the Hartz reforms to
trade partners but small positive effects with respect to unemployment and sizeable positive
spillovers in terms of consumption and output in the long run. These results are driven by
modelling devices which are the most reasonable for an analysis of the European countries—
intra-industry-trade and labour market rigidities accompanied by a fairly high unemployment
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rate. A further notable observation is that neither the Hartz reforms nor the decline in the
bargaining power of workers seem to explain the large current account surpluses of Germany
that came into being after 2005. This is indeed in line with the latest findings, as our review
of the recent literature suggests, which reports non-price-competitiveness factors rather than
labour market reforms as the main driving forces of surpluses.
We find that the adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium takes place rather quickly
following the Hartz reforms, the adjustment for labour market variables being almost entirely
completed over 2-3 years. Other quantities such as output, consumption and investment
register a non-negligible part of their adjustment also over such a short period; however,
arriving at the new long-run equilibrium takes much longer for these variables. This is
due to consumption smoothing and the effects of international resource-sharing on capital
accumulation: both Germany and the rest of the euro area increase their capital stock very
slowly and gradually after the reforms. The favourable effects of the reforms on production
possibilities leads the rest of the euro area to invest in German bonds in the first 7-8 years
after the reforms which are then driven down in order to increase own consumption.
Recall that we compared trends in the German data over the 8-year period 2003-2010
with the change in equilibrium values in our model. Since most business cycle effects typically
cancel out each other over such a long period and the adjustment to the new steady state
is largely completed for almost all variables of the model within 2-3 years, this should not
be problematic for our short-run analysis. A crucial aspect that might affect our long-run
comparisons and we did not address in the model is the 2008-2009 global financial and
economic crisis. We reckon, for example, that the lack of the global financial crisis in our
model could partly explain its overshooting of the drop in the unemployment rate when
driven by the Hartz reforms. In this context, it should be emphasized that the German
government introduced a number of anti-crisis measures with a positive impact on the labour
market outcomes, discussed by e.g. Faia, Lechthaler, and Merkl (2013) and Burda and Hunt
(2011) among others. However, those were measures that focused on evening out negative
business cycle effects. While long-run effects of the crisis is a contentious topic and is left
to future studies, we reckon that the exclusion of the crisis from our model would not lead
to any significant changes in our conclusions as to the relation of the Hartz reforms to the
2003-2010 trends in the German macroeconomic data.
To sum up, our study suggests that the German Hartz reforms can only partially explain
the wage restraint and consumption dampening observed in the data and do not lead to any
beggar-thy-neighbour effects on the trade partners that manifest themselves as a decrease
in employment, output or consumption and as large current account surpluses of Germany.
Moreover, we find that the effects of the reforms depend on the institutional level of an
economy and that there are non-negligible interaction effects between reforms. Therefore,
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using the German reforms as best-practice policy may not be advisable as institutions and
initial conditions in the labour markets differ across European countries.
Note that, while our model proves to be a useful tool for the analysis of the aggregate
effects of the Hartz reforms, it is not informative about distributional issues. The findings of
Krebs and Scheffel (2013) suggest, however, that the reform of the unemployment benefits
created losses in terms of lifetime consumption for the unemployed, whereas employed per-
sons gained. If these distributional issues are not tackled by the government, the reputation
of such reforms in the public might be low, as it has been the case in Germany.
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A Optimization in the Foreign Country
A.1 Foreign Households
Similar to its domestic counterpart, the representative foreign household maximizes its
expected life-time utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [N2tU(C
n
2t, h2t) + (1−N2t)U(C
u
2t)] , (34)
where the functional form of the per-period utility is the same as for country 1 (see equations
(2) and (3)). Foreign households’ optimization is subject to the budget constraint (in terms
of the good produced in the domestic economy)
P c2t (1 + τ
c
2)C
c
2t +B2t+1 + P
c
2tCA2t =
= ToTtN2tw2th2t
(
1− τd2
)
+ (1−N2t)ToTtb2t +B2t (1 + it) + T2t + Π
F
2t (35)
and to the law of motion of employment symmetric to equation (7). In addition foreign bond
holders face the same portfolio adjustment costs as domestic bond holders.
The first order conditions for this optimization problem are given by
1
Cc2t
= (1 + τ c2)λ2tP
c
2t (36)
1 + Φb
B2t+1
P c2t
= βEt
[
λ2t+1
λ2t
(1 + it+1)
]
. (37)
The preferences of foreign households regarding the composition of the final consumption
bundle resemble the domestic one and can be written as
Cc2t =
[
κ
1
ηC∗2t
η−1
η + (1− κ)
1
η C∗1t
η−1
η
] η
η−1
. (38)
By minimizing the costs for Cc2t the following foreign demand functions are obtained:
C∗2t = κ
(
ToTt
P c2t
)
−η
Cc2t (39)
C∗1t = (1− κ)
(
1
P c2t
)
−η
Cc2t. (40)
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A.2 Foreign Firms
Foreign firms face the same production technology, capital adjustment costs and law of
motion for capital and employment as domestic firms when maximizing their profits given
by
ΠF2t = ToTtY2t − ToTtw2th2tN2t
(
1 + τ f2
)
− ω2P
c
2tV2t − P
c
2tI
c
2t − P
c
2tCI2t (41)
with respect to capital, labour and vacancies. The resulting optimality conditions read as
qT2t = βEt
[
P c2t+1λ2t+1
P c2tλ2t
{
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P c2t+1
α
Y2t+1
K2t+1
+ qT2t+1 − δ +
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2
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)2}]
(42)
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ω2
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}]
,
(43)
where qT2t is Tobin’s q and defined symmetrically to country 1.
A.3 Matching and Bargaining in the Foreign Labour
Market
The matching and bargaining process follows exactly the same rules as in the domestic
labour market (see equations (21) and (22)). The labour contract defining the optimal level
of wages and hours worked should satisfy the following first order conditions:
κn2
λ2t
(1− h2t)
−ξ =
1− τd2
1 + τ f2
ToTt (1− α)
Y2t
N2th2t
(44)
w2th2t =
1− ǫ
1 + τ f2
[
ω2
P c2t
ToTt
θ2t + (1− α)
Y2t
N2t
]
+
ǫ
1− τd2
[
b2t +
1
ToTtλ2t
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n
2
(1− h2t)
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)]
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(45)
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